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I. SCOPE OF ANALYSIS
HE United Parcel Service Strike of 1997 drew attention to the im-
pact of part-time workers on the economic functioning of corpora-
tions in the United States. In light of the reality that part-timers,
independent contractors, leased employees, and other members of the
"contingent workforce" play a major role in corporate America, a recent
decision of the Ninth Circuit was met with a collective gasp by employers
when it seemingly held the use of the contingent workforce to be a con-
temptuous practice.
This Comment focuses on the impact of classification of workers on the
benefits required to be provided to the members of the contingent
workforce. It takes an in-depth look at the approaches of the various
circuits that have addressed the issue, their reasoning, and their analyses.
Of course, the courts' treatment of any particular case does not, and can-
not, occur in a vacuum. This Comment emphasizes the specific factual
scenarios which have led to litigation in the various circuits. Numerous
factors may cause a court to hand down a particular decision on any given
day, and the social, political, and economic views of a court will necessar-
ily influence that court's decision. In some areas of contemporary signifi-
cance, such factors may even play a substantial role. However, but for
the particular fact pattern of a given case, the result might very well be
different. One of the goals of this Comment is to demonstrate to the
practitioner, the employer, and the casual reader alike that the way "em-
ployment" arrangements are structured, and as a last resort, litigated,
may tip the hat in favor of one party or the other, regardless of the views
held by any particular court.
In the final analysis, this Comment will demonstrate that it is up to
those employers and their legal representatives to take control of shaping
their workforces within the limits of this dynamic and sometimes contro-
versial area of the law. In the area of employment law, perhaps more so
than others, the Supreme Court's caution that "'bad facts make bad law,'
[and] so too odd facts make odd law"1 is particularly applicable. It is the
responsibility of the employers and their representatives to create good
facts that will result in the application of good law.
II. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
A. THE UNITED PARCEL SERVICE STRIKE
The 1997 strike by the Teamsters Union against United Parcel Service,
1. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 659 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Though used in the context of a criminal law case, this quote seems to be quite appropriate
and applicable to the interesting and sometimes bizarre fact patterns that surround many
of the cases in the employee benefits arena.
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America's largest strike in three decades, 2 has brought the issue of em-
ployer flexibility in hiring and employee benefits into the spotlight.3
"The walkout against United Parcel Service stemmed from the inevitable
clash of two powerful forces in the nation's economy: the revitalized la-
bor movement's opposition to the use of part-time workers and corporate
America's insistence that it needs such workers to remain competitive."'4
To remain successful, "[c]ompanies will fight to keep the flexibility that
they achieved in the past decade to dictate where, when, and how to pro-
duce products and services."' 5 In an age when flexibility and speed are
corporate necessities, United Parcel Service and others see part-timers as
an "economic lifeline."' 6 At United Parcel Service, success has stemmed
in part from an aggressive growth plan based on hiring large quantities of
part-time workers in an effort to keep costs low. 7 "Growing labor costs
threaten a cut in profits and pressure to raise prices."8
On the other hand, it is argued that corporate profits at the expense of
employee well-being "is not the right direction for America... our com-
munities ... [or our] working families."9 "There are no part-time mort-
gages [and] ... no part-time loan payments." 10 The disgruntled note a
sense that job security has vanished. 1
While the United Parcel Service strike provides a useful case study of
the effect of part-time workers on the economy, it does not complete the
picture. The mounting concern over the imbalance between corporate
wealth and employment classification actually considers a much wider
field. 12 It is this broader category of workers, the "contingent
workforce," that comprises the subject of the remainder of this
Comment.
2. See The Teamsters and UPS: America's flexible labour market is a wonderful thing,
so long ads firms handle their employees wisely and equitably, ECONOMIsT, Aug. 16, 1997, at
14, available in 1997 WL 13361151.
3. See Janine Jackson, Business-as-usual Labor Coverage, IN THESE TiMES, Sept. 22,
1997, at 8 (noting that the strike "forced the media to report on the shake-down in the
American workplace").
4. Steven Greenhouse, The U.P.S. Walkout: News Analysis; High Stakes for 2 Titans,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1997, Late Edition at Al.
5. Paul Magnusson et al., A Wake-up Call for Business, Bus. WK., Sept. 1, 1997, at 28,
available in 1997 WL 8271479.
6. See Greenhouse, supra note 4.
7. See Aaron Bernstein, At UPS, Part-time Work is a Full-time Issue, Bus. WK., June
16, 1997, at 88, available in 1997 WL 8270406.
8. James C. Cooper & Kathleen Madigan, Shoppers are Back Stoking the Economy's
Fire, Bus. WK., Sept. 1, 1997, at 25, available in 1997 WL 8271477.
9. Greenhouse, supra note 4 (quoting Rand Wilson, spokesman for the Teamsters
Union).
10. Jennifer Wells et al., Labor's Rising Tide: As the economy improves, unions de-
mand their share, MACLEAN'S, Sept. 15, 1997, at 58, available in 1997 WL 14335860 (quot-
ing Darrell Tingley, president of the Canadian Union of Postal Workers).
11. See Teamsters, supra note 2. "[E]mployment has become only a temporary rela-
tionship that can be altered or terminated at the employer's convenience." Id
12. See Jennifer Middleton, Contingent Workers in a Changing Economy: Endure,
Adapt, or Organize?, 22 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc CHANGE 557, 564-70 (1996).
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B. THE CONTINGENT WORKFORCE
The term contingent workforce has become a catch-all for the types of
employment arrangements typically referred to in the context of individu-
als who work something other than the traditional full-time job. 13 Part-
timers as well as contract workers, temporary workers, independent con-
tractors, leased employees, and day workers all fall within the ranks of
the contingent workforce. 14
Those who opposed the use of the part-time workforce gloss over
"workplace realities."'1 5 In fact, most part-time workers, according to
surveys, prefer their arrangement. 16
Of the estimated [twenty-one million] part-time workers, about [six
million] are students, and another [two million] are retirees seeking
to supplement their pensions. A further [five and a half million] say
that family or personal obligations make part-time work desirable.
This feeling is particularly pronounced among mothers with young
children. In [a] recent survey by America's Labour [sic] Depart-
ment, fewer than [five percent] of part-time workers say they work
part-time because they could not find full-time jobs. Above all, all
the evidence shows that America's flexible labour [sic] market has
created jobs, not destroyed them.' 7
It is also a widely held fallacy that more and more people are being
forced into the part-time workforce.' 8 In reality, about eighteen percent
of people in the workforce can be categorized as part-timers, according to
a 1995 study by the U.S. Department of Labor,19 and part-time jobs have
been fairly steady at this level for about twenty years.20
Regardless of one's perceptions of the practical and social pros and
cons of the widespread use of a contingent workforce, there remains the
issue of under what set of guidelines and regulations must those who
choose to employ a contingent workforce operate regarding employee
benefit plans. The struggle to find a suitable answer is the subject of the
remainder of this comment.
13. See id. at 564 (noting that approximately "thirty-two to thirty-seven million, or
about one-quarter of the nation's working population," fall into the various categories of
workers comprising the contingent workforce).
14. See id. at 564-70.
15. See Matthew Miller, Packaging the Strike: In the UPS strike, the real issues were
obsecured, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Sept. 1, 1997, at 44, 46 (noting that, at least in the
case of UPS, nearly half of the part-timers were under 25, 40% were college students, and
only five percent had been with the company more than 10 years). The article also notes
that the "bulk" of those workers preferred part-time work to help pay college bills or to
provide flexibility. See id. at 46.
16. See Teamsters, supra note 2.
17. Id.
18. See Jim Barlow, Stats Don't Back Teamsters' Charge, HousT. CHRON., Aug. 7,
1997, at 1, available in 1997 WL 13054964.
19. See id.
20. See Miller, supra note 15, at 46 (referencing economist Alec Levenson of the
Milken Institute, a think tank based in Santa Monica).
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C. CONGRESS AND THE COURTS' STRUGGLE TO FIND THE SOLUTION
Through the years, Congress has enacted various measures aimed at
employee protection. Unfortunately, these acts do little to provide a
clear standard by which length of service, hours worked, or type of em-
ployment can be utilized for the determination of required benefits.2 '
1. The Fair Labor Standards Act
What is clear is that in its more recent enactments, Congress has drifted
away from the broad inclusion of employees under the umbrella of the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.22 Under the Fair Labor Standards
Act, Congress included, as covered employees, any individual who is em-
ployed by an employer to work in interstate commerce.23 Under the Act,
to "employ" means "to suffer or permit to work."'24 The early decisions
interpreting the Act made it clear that such a broad reading was the in-
tention of the Congress.25
2. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act
More recent enactments, such as ERISA,26 provide a much more re-
strictive approach to the determination of coverage. ERISA protection is
limited to "employees with significant periods of service." 27 Employees,
under ERISA, are not granted credit for a year of service until they have
completed at least 1,000 hours of service within a consecutive twelve
month period.28 From the language of ERISA, it is clear that it was not
the intent of Congress to provide benefits to all employees, absent a sig-
nificant amount of service to their employers. In fact, even opponents of
the widespread use of the contingent workforce admit that Congress
made a "deliberate choice to exclude part-time or short-term workers
21. See Middleton, supra note 12, at 571.
22. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994). See also 29 C.F.R. § 791.2 (1996).
23. See Fair Labor Standards Act § 203(e)(1).
24. Id. at § 203(g).
25. See Wirtz v. Louisiana Trailer Sales, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 76, 79 (E.D. La. 1968) (not-
ing that the Act is not to be read restrictively, but "with Congress' purpose in mind"); see
also Walling v. John J. Casale, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 520, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (noting that the
act must be construed in the context of the history of governmental authority over indus-
trial enterprise); Wirtz v. San Francisco & Oakland Helicopter Airlines, Inc., 244 F. Supp.
680, 683 (N.D. Cal. 1965), affd, 370 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1966) (noting that the proper test to
be applied in construing the Fair Labor Standards Act is the economic reality of the case).
26. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(c). ERISA does not define "significant periods of service" in
section 1001(c). However, section 1053(a) does provide some guidance. An employee
benefit plan is in compliance with ERISA if, inter alia, "an employee who has completed at
least 5 years of service has a nonforfeitable right to 100 percent of the employee's accrued
benefit derived from employer contributions." 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2)(A). Additionally, a
plan is in compliance "if an employee has a nonforfeitable right to a percentage of the
employee's accrued benefit derived from employer contributions." 29 U.S.C.
§ 1053(a)(2)(B). The percentage is based upon the number of years of service, with the
minimum required for tenure being three years, at which time the employee must be eligi-
ble for twenty percent of the accrued benefit. See id.
28. See 29 U.S.C. § 1053(b)(2)(A).
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from the protections of its most recent labor legislation .... ,,29
Unfortunately, the matter is more convoluted than a simple look at
ERISA would suggest. Movements in Congress have attempted to ad-
dress the perceived imbalance between corporate America and its work-
ers, but to date such movements have been ineffective. 30 In the words of
one commentator, "temporary-employment relationships are so evanes-
cent that they elude definition, [and] the legislative impasse has forced
the courts to define modem [contingent] employment using a superannu-
ated common law framework that originally contemplated nothing more
complex than the permanent employment situation. '31
3. The Courts Offer Their Two Cents
The courts of appeal for the various circuits have taken a varied and
divergent approach to the classification of employees, the resultant bur-
dens placed on employee benefit plans, and the benefits due workers.
The courts are split along lines similar to those found in the general popu-
lace. Several of the circuits have based their opinions on what the author
perceives to be a "big business" mentality, while others have taken an
alternate route, putting the concerns of the employee first, perhaps to the
detriment of the employer.
Various tests have been utilized in an attempt to facilitate the classifica-
tion of workers and benefit plans, and even those have met with dissimi-
lar application in the courts of appeal. The courts have relied, inter alia,
on the common law, the Internal Revenue Code,32 and the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). 33
III. ANALYSIS
A. THE CASES34
1. Setting the Stage-Microsoft 135
In October of 1996, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided
29. Middleton, supra note 12, at 574.
30. See Note, Temporary Employment and the Imbalance of Power, 109 HARV. L. REV.
1647, 1649 (1996).
31. Id.
32. I.R.C. §§ 1-9722 (1994).
33. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
34. The cases must be thoroughly scrutinized in order to understand their holdings
clearly and to prevent the sort of widespread paranoia that resulted from the Microsoft
cases which are addressed at the outset of this section. Only after a detailed analysis of the
facts of a particular case, and the application of law to those facts, will the employer or
attorney be prepared to assess his own hiring and benefit plans, or those of his client or a
hypothetical client. After reviewing several cases decided in the wake of Microsoft I by
different circuits, it is hoped that the reader will recognize a pattern of generally acceptable
practices as well as practices which may or may not be acceptable based on established law,
and in some cases, the political or social climate of a particular circuit.
35. Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 1996), aff'd on reh'g, 120 F.3d
1006 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 899 (1998) [hereinafter Microsoft I].
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Microsoft 1,36 and in so doing "cast a cloud over the way some... compa-
nies employ free-lance workers."37 As a result of this single case, many
employers have taken to reviewing carefully their use of a free-lance
workforce.38 While such review is to be applauded, in many cases em-
ployers have simply run scared and taken Microsoft I for more than it is
worth, in some cases even eliminating the practice of using free-lance
workers altogether.39 Not only has this "knee jerk" approach hurt those
businesses who have determined that free-lancers are the best solution
for their particular needs, it "also hurts those individuals who, for
whatever reason, prefer to offer their services as free-lance workers
rather than become regular employees. '40 Considering that Microsoft I
is, as characterized by one commentator, a "somewhat anomalous Ninth
Circuit case," 41 such abandonment of a widespread practice with poten-
tially mutual benefits to employers and workers alike may be premature.
The Microsoft I court found that employees designated as independent
contractors had been misclassified, and on that basis had been wrongfully
denied participation in Microsoft's benefit plans.42 The plaintiffs' claim
was that although classified as independent contractors by Microsoft,
they actually fell within the common-law definition of employee and,
therefore, were entitled to the benefits that the company provided to all
of its regular or permanent employees.43 The workers, though not cur-
rently covered by an ERISA plan, nonetheless had the requisite standing
to bring the suit under ERISA.44
36. See id.
37. G. Pascal Zachary & Tom Herman, Microsoft Case on Free-Lancers Will Be
Reheard, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 1997, at B9, available in 1997 WL-WSJ 2409143.
38. See Beverly W. Garofalo, Microsoft II Forces Closer Look at Use of Free-lance
Workers, CORP. CouNs., Aug. 1997, at *1.
39. See id. at *11; see also Tom Herman, A Special Summary and Forecast of Federal
and State Tax Developments, WALL ST. J., July 30, 1997, at Al, available in 1997 WL-WSJ
2429728 (quoting Tim Sparks, a lawyer at Wilson Sonsini in Palo Alto, California "That
decision 'sends a wakeup call to employers that they need to go back and review their
plans and their documents."').
40. Garofalo, supra note 38, at *11.
41. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Employees, Pensions, and the New Economic Order, 97 CoLuM.
L. REV. 1519, 1566 n.42 (1997).
42. See Microsoft 1, 97 F.3d at 1197. From the first sentence of its lengthy opinion, the
Microsoft I court made it clear that it considered contemporary employment practices in-
volving large scale use of the contingent workforce to be suspect. See id. at 1189. The
court declared that "[ljarge corporations have increasingly adopted the practice of hiring
temporary employees or independent contractors as a means of avoiding payment of em-
ployee benefits, and thereby increasing their profits." Id. (emphasis added). Such a forceful
opening remark leaves little room for the possibility that the Ninth Circuit sees much, if
any, redeeming value in corporate America's use of the contingent workforce.
43. The workers' claims focused on the Microsoft Savings Plus Plan (SPP) and the
Employee Stock Purchase Plan (ESPP). The court determined that the SPP was a 26
U.S.C. § 401(k) plan which is covered by ERISA, and that the ESPP was a 26 U.S.C. § 423
plan which is not covered by ERISA, but is governed in part by Washington state law
principles. See id. at 1192, 1196-97.
44. The terms of ERISA provide that a person is empowered to bring a civil action if
he is either a participant or a beneficiary seeking "to recover benefits due to him under the
terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to
1999] 1823
SMU LAW REVIEW
The United States Supreme Court has determined that a claimant with
a "colorable claim that (1) he will prevail in a suit for benefits, or that (2)
eligibility requirements will be fulfilled in the future in order to establish"
his eligibility has standing under ERISA.45 The district court disagreed
with the validity of the workers' claims and granted a motion for sum-
mary judgment in Microsoft's favor. On appeal, the 9th Circuit reversed
in part and remanded in part.46 When it was announced that the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit would grant rehearing in the case, this time
by the full eleven judge panel, the media saw the announcement as a
"potential boost to scores of high-tech companies that employ contract
professionals in order to gain flexibility and cut benefit costs." '47 Unfortu-
nately, in its en banc rehearing, the Ninth Circuit did not reverse the ear-
lier panel decision as had been anxiously anticipated by corporate
America and the media alike.48 The en banc rehearing, Microsoft II, is
discussed infra, Part III-A-2.
2. Microsoft 11
What follows is a detailed analysis of four of the pre-eminent and most
recent cases from the Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits which
tackle the "contingent worker" benefits dilemma head-on. After ad-
dressing those cases, this Comment addresses the main issues with which
the courts dealt, as well as issues which should be considered by the em-
ployer and his legal representatives when making employment decisions
involving the use of the contingent workforce.
future benefits under the terms of the plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(l)(B) (1994). A "partici-
pant" means:
any employee or former employee of an employer, or any member or former
member of an employee organization, who is or may become eligible to re-
ceive a benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan which covers em-
ployees of such employer or members of such organization, or whose
beneficiaries may be eligible to receive any such benefit.
29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (1994) (emphasis added).
45. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 103 (1989).
46. See Microsoft 1, 97 F.3d at 1200. The court reversed the district court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of Microsoft and denial of summary judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs. The remaining issue of eligibility of individual members was remanded, as was
calculation of the damages or benefits due the class members. See id.
47. Zachary, supra note 37. The authors noted that decisions by the appellate court to
rehear a case are rare. See id. The article quoted San Francisco attorney Victor Schacter
as saying that the decision "bodes very well for the possibility that the entire Ninth Circuit
will take a different view." Id.
48. In Microsoft II, discussed infra Part III-A-2, the full Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals again reversed and remanded, with eight justices concurring in part and dissenting in




Microsoft 11 was the Ninth Circuit's en banc rehearing of Microsoft L
The Microsoft workers who brought the suit were, in the words of the
court:
"fully integrated... into its workforce: they often worked on teams
along with regular employees, sharing the same supervisors, per-
forming identical functions, and working the same core hours. Be-
cause Microsoft required that they work on site, they received
admittance card keys, office equipment and supplies from the com-
pany." However, they were not paid for their services through the
payroll department, but rather submitted invoices to and were paid
through the accounts payable department.50
Upon hiring, Microsoft entered into two written agreements with each
of the workers. The first, a "Microsoft Corporation Independent Con-
tractor Copyright Assignment and Non-Disclosure Agreement," con-
tained a provision that the worker "agrees to be responsible for all
federal and state taxes, withholding, social security, insurance and other
benefits."5 1 The second set of forms, entitled "Independent Contractor/
Freelancer Information," made it clear that the worker is "self-employed
and [is] responsible to pay all [his/her] own insurance and benefits."52
Additionally, evidence before the Ninth Circuit panel in Microsoft I indi-
cated that "(1) the plaintiffs understood that they were not to receive
benefits under the plans in the case at the time of hiring and (2) the plain-
tiffs understood that they would receive more cash on an hourly basis
than regular employees."'53
In 1989 and 1990 the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) audited
Microsoft's records and determined that the company should have with-
held and paid taxes on the subject workers' behalf.54 This finding was
based on the IRS's determination that the workers were employees
rather than independent contractors.5 5 The IRS made this determination
by applying traditional common law principles 56 and the applicable Treas-
ury Regulations concerning the terms "employee" 57 and "relationship of
49. 120 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 899 (1998) [hereinafter
Microsoft 1].
50. Id. at 1008 (quoting Microsoft 1, 97 F.3d at 1190).
51. Microsoft 1, 97 F.3d at 1190.
52. Id.
53. Microsoft Employees Who Were Misclassified as Independent Contractors Get Ben-
efits Under the Company's Thrift and Stock Purchase Plans, ERISA LITIG. REP., Dec. 1996,
at *11.
54. See Microsoft II, 120 F.3d at 1008.
55. See id.
56. The Internal Revenue Service definition of an employee is "any individual who,
under the usual common law rules applicable in determining the employer-employee rela-
tionship, has the status of an employee." I.R.C. § 3121(d)(2) (emphasis added).
57. "The term employee includes every individual performing services if the relation-
ship between him and the person for whom he performs such services is the legal relation-
ship of employer and employee." 26 C.F.R. § 31.3401(c)-l(a) (1999).
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the employer and employee." 58 The same essential principles are used
for determinations under 401(k) plans such as the SPP, and 423 plans
such as the ESPP.59 "As soon as Microsoft realized that the IRS, at least,
thought that the Workers were employees, it took steps to correct its er-
ror."'60 These steps included issuing W-2 forms to the workers and paying
Microsoft's share of the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA)
taxes to the government. 61 At the same time, Microsoft changed its pay-
ment system. Because it "made no sense to have employees paid through
the accounts payable department .... those who remained in essentially
the same relationship as before were tendered offers to become acknowl-
edged employees." 62
[B]oth Microsoft and the SPP have conceded for purposes of this
appeal that the Workers were common law employees. In fact, they
have asserted that the Workers' status is a "nonissue" because they
concede that the Workers were common law employees. That is to
say, they were employees of Microsoft.63
Microsoft probably felt safe in making the concession, under the as-
sumption that the waivers would certainly shield it from liability.64 By its
58. Generally the relationship of employer and employee exists when the per-
son for whom services are performed has the right to control and direct the
individual who performs the services, not only as to the result to be accom-
plished by the work but also as to the details and means by which that result
is accomplished. That is, an employee is subject to the will and control of the
employer not only as to what shall be done but how it shall be done. In this
connection, it is not necessary that the employer actually direct or control the
manner in which the services are performed; it is sufficient if he has the right
to do so. The right to discharge is also an important factor indicating that the
person possessing that right is an employer. Other factors characteristic of
an employer, but not necessarily present in every case, are the furnishing of
tools and the furnishing of a place to work to the individual who performs
the services. In general, if an individual is subject to the control or direction
of another merely as to the result to be accomplished by the work and not as
to the means and methods for accomplishing the result, he is not an
employee.
26 C.F.R. § 31.3401(c)-l(b).
59. See 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.410(b)-9, 1.423-2(e)(2), 1.421-7(h); see also Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322 (1992) (noting that when Congress uses the word
employee, the courts must assume the established meaning of that word, unless a particular
statute indicates otherwise).
60. Microsoft II, 120 F.3d at 1011 (emphasis added). This immediate compliance with
the IRS by Microsoft touches on the issue of the safe harbor provisions of section 530 of
the Revenue Act of 1978. These provisions may, in certain limited cases, grant some relief
to taxpayers who have a reasonable basis for treating workers as other than employees and
who satisfy other statutory requirements. See Revenue Act of 1978 § 530, Pub. L. No. 95-
600, 92 Stat. 2763 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.A. 3401 note (West Supp. 1997)).
From the facts of the Microsoft case, it is not clear that the provisions would have had any
effect, or even have been a sound argument. It is also not clear to what extent the IRS
placed liability on Microsoft. However, the provisions are a factor to be considered by the
legal professional when dealing with the IRS in the employee classification situation.
61. See id.
62. Il at 1009 (emphasis added).
63. Id at 1010 (emphasis added).
64. See F. Lee Perkins, Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.: Are Independent Contractors Eli-
gible for Employee Benefits?, 21 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC., 205, 207 (1997). Though perhaps
over-exaggerating, one commentator remarked:
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immediate actions, Microsoft management expressed its recognition that
the workers' signed statements were not effective waivers of income tax
withholding. However, Microsoft took no actions at that time that could
be understood to indicate that it had abandoned the employment agree-
ments as they apply to benefits ordinarily reserved for "employees."
Once the workers realized that they had been determined to be em-
ployees of Microsoft, at least for federal income tax purposes, they as-
serted a right to participate in Microsoft's benefit plans. When
Microsoft's management refused, the workers asked the SPP plan admin-
istrator to exercise his authority to declare them eligible for benefits. A
panel, convened by the SPP administrator, determined that the employ-
ees were not entitled to benefits from ERISA plans, such as the SPP, or
from non-ERISA plans, such as the ESPP.65 The panel argued that re-
gardless of the workers' new-found status, they had voluntarily waived
the right to participation in benefit plans.66 It was this disagreement be-
tween the panel and the workers that led to the litigation.
The Ninth Circuit, in interpreting the alleged waivers, found that the
agreements "merely warn the Workers about what happens to them if
they are independent contractors." 67 In so finding, the court conceded
that a possible argument existed that "the statements about benefits, un-
like statements about withholding, stand on their own footing as a waiver
of benefits, regardless of the Workers' true status as employees. '68 How-
ever, as the court pointed out, "Microsoft assured us at argument that this
is not a waiver case." 69
Having rather summarily dismissed any waiver effect of the employ-
ment agreements, the court addressed the benefit plans, which were the
subject of the litigation. The court first reviewed the decision of the
SPP's administrative panel to deny benefits,70 and in so doing, announced
In view of Microsoft's concession that the contingent workers were indeed
common-law employees, the court's decision in Microsoft I [the same deci-
sion, in essence, was ultimately reached in Microsoft III was noteworthy
more for its critical tenor toward the growing practice of companies utilizing
contingent workers than for its ultimate holding that the workers were eligi-
ble for benefits under the terms of the plans.
Garofalo, supra note 38, at *5.
65. See Microsoft II, 120 F.3d at 1009.
66. See id.
67. Id. at 1011. The court considered that the waivers hinged on the status determina-
tion itself. Having found that the independent contractor label was an error, by
Microsoft's own admission, there was "no reason to embrace and perpetuate that error" by
giving weight to the waivers. Id. at 1012. The court recognized a possible argument that
they would have to reform the contracts in order to remove the mistake but asserted that
Microsoft had "saved [the court] and the Workers the trouble of applying reformation
doctrine when it agreed that the Workers were, in fact, not independent contractors." Id.
68. Id. at 1012.
69. Id. This precluded an at-length analysis by the court of the waiver issue as it ap-
plies to the ERISA benefit plan scenario. In Part III-B-2 infra, this comment addresses
waiver as a separate issue. Waiver is of very real importance to the employer or his legal
representative, and there is case law to support the use of a waiver argument.
70. See id. at 1013.
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that it was applying an arbitrary and capricious standard. 71
The court saw two possible justifications for the panel's decision: first,
the panel's incorrect assumption that the workers were independent con-
tractors; and second, the panel's incorrect application of waiver law to the
agreements. 72 The court determined that "the reasons given for denying
benefits were arbitrary and capricious because they were based upon
legal errors which 'misconstrued the Plan and applied a wrong standard
to a benefits determination.' ' 73 Here again the court noted that "[t]he
SPP now concedes as much .... ,74 Had Microsoft made a strong case for
waiver, it may have succeeded in overcoming the arbitrary and capricious
standard.75
The court did not, however, make a final determination as to the work-
ers' rights under the SPP. The court recognized an issue of plan construc-
tion brought up by the SPP and the workers for the first time at the
district court level. The issue was whether the plan's restriction to work-
ers on the United States payroll of the employer applied to employees
who were not on the US payroll, but ought to be.76 The court accepted
the fact that such a decision was one for the plan administrator and not
the courts, as it "is not the court's function ab initio to apply the correct
standard to [the participant's] claim. That function, under the Plan, is
reserved to the Plan administrator. '77 Because the panel never had an
opportunity to review that question, the court correctly provided it with
one, through remand. The court's treatment of this issue seems to indi-
cate that a specific, non-arbitrarily applied plan might have been met with
a greater willingness by the court to let a denial of benefits to the workers
71. It is not entirely clear that the actual standard applied by the court meets the
traditional, deferential understanding of the arbitrary and capricious standard, however.
The Supreme Court has determined that benefit determinations are to be reviewed using a
de novo standard, unless the administrators of the plan have discretionary authority to
determine eligibility. Where such discretion exists, the review is to be conducted using the
arbitrary and capricious standard. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 111. "The arbitrary or capri-
cious standard is the least demanding form of judicial review of administrative action. Any
questions of judgment are left to the ... administrator of the Plan." Pokratz v. Jones Dairy
Farm, 771 F.2d 206, 209 (7th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added). Absent special circumstances
such as fraud or bad faith, the Committee's decision may not be deemed arbitrary or capri-
cious so long as it is possible to offer a reasoned explanation, based on the evidence, for
that decision. See Exbom v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Health & Wel-
fare Fund, 900 F.2d 1138, 1142 (7th Cir. 1990).
72. See Microsoft II, 120 F.3d at 1013.
73. Id. (quoting Saffle v. Sierra Pac. Power Co. Bargaining Unit Long Term Disability
Income Plan, 85 F.3d 455, 461 (9th Cir. 1996)).
74. Id.
75. A decision is arbitrary and capricious when the decision maker:
has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation
for its decision that runs counter to the evidence.., or is so implausible that
it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of ... expertise.
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (em-
phasis added).
76. See Microsoft II, 120 F.3d at 1013-14.




stand, regardless of their status as employees. 78
The court next addressed the ESPP, which was established under 26
U.S.C. § 423, and which, as previously noted, is not covered under ER-
ISA. The court found that the plan was "approved by the board of direc-
tors and by the shareholders of Microsoft. Their action was an offer to
employees, as that term is defined in section 423.''79 The court also found
that under Washington state law, such an offer could be accepted by em-
ployees by merely continuing to work with knowledge of the offer, re-
gardless of their knowledge of the precise details of the plan.80
In accordance with its prior findings concerning the mistaken classifica-
tion, the court held that the plaintiffs were employees for the purposes of
eligibility for the ESPP.81 Since their continued employment constituted
acceptance of that offer, the court found that they must be allowed to
participate if they so choose. Because the ESPP required employees to
pay for any purchase of stock, the court remanded the ESPP issue to the
district court for the determination of an appropriate remedy.82 The
court's treatment of this issue indicates that plans such as the ESPP,
which is governed by 26 U.S.C. § 423, will be interpreted in light of appli-
cable state law, and depending on that law, may not be subject to further
interpretation.83
In a separate opinion, three judges took exception to the majority's
analysis and applied a much more conservative, employer-oriented ap-
proach. The dissent noted that the majority had refused to call the plain-
tiffs "freelancers," the term used within the Microsoft community and by
the plaintiffs themselves, and insisted on referring to them as "work-
ers. '8 The dissent also noted that the freelancers were not treated the
same as other Microsoft workers. "They had different color employee
badges, different e-mail addresses, and were not invited to company par-
78. In a separate opinion, five judges pointed out that had it been proper for the court
to address the US payroll issue, the court could have found for the workers on the issue
without even interpreting the language of the plan. See id. at 1017-18. The judges deter-
mined that the workers were clearly employees and, just as clearly, they were on
Microsoft's payroll, retrospectively. When combined with the fact that the employees were
US citizens, the judges found that any interpretation of the requirement that recipients of
the plan's benefits be on the United States payroll of the employer would be satisfied. See
id. This separate opinion also seems to suggest that carefully worded plan requirements
are essential in achieving the employer's goals.
79. Id. at 1014.
80. See id. The court based this finding on Dorward v. ILWU-PMA Pension Plan, 452
P.2d 258 (Wash. 1969) (finding the consideration rendered for a promise in a pension con-
tract to be established when an employee is shown to have knowledge of the pension plan
and continues his employment, even though the precise terms of the pension agreement
are not known).
81. See id
82. See id. at 1014-15.
83. The thrust of this comment is the treatment of employee benefit plans as adminis-
tered on a non-state-specific basis. As a result, the author's selection of case law and depth
of analysis is weighted towards those plans applicable without regard to state borders.
Such plans are typically of the variety covered by ERISA.




ties and functions. Instead of receiving a regular paycheck from
Microsoft's Payroll department (like Microsoft's regular employees),
freelancers submitted invoices for their services to the Accounts Payable
department. ' 85 The thrust of the dissent focused on the majority's treat-
ment of the ESPP. The dissent found the issue to be "a simple contracts
case."' 86 Noting that offer, acceptance, and consideration are requisites to
contract formation under Washington law, the dissent found that these
elements were not satisfied.87
As to an offer, the dissent pointed out that under Washington law, an
"employer revokes a generally promulgated offer when it enters into a
specific agreement with an employee which is inconsistent with the of-
fer."'88 In the words of the dissent:
Microsoft's board offered the ESPP to employees generally, and
then Microsoft told the freelancers: "We aren't offering the ESPP to
you; ESPP benefits are not included in your contract." Knowing that
they wouldn't get ESPP benefits, the freelancers nevertheless agreed
to work for Microsoft. Their contract therefore does not include
ESPP benefits because the offer of those benefits was revoked.89
Additionally, the dissent found that the contract failed for a lack of con-
sideration. There was no detrimental reliance on the part of the freelanc-
ers, who knew they were not entitled to ESPP benefits, yet chose to work
for Microsoft for several years on Microsoft's terms.9°
With regard to the SPP, the dissent concurred with the majority's deci-
sion to remand to the plan administrator for interpretation of the require-
ment that the workers be on the United States payroll of the employer. 91
However, the dissent disagreed with the court's dicta suggesting that
Microsoft might not have been properly able to classify employees for
participation or non-participation in ERISA benefits based on whether
the employees were regular hires paid through the payroll department or
freelancers paid through the Accounts Payable department.92 The dis-
sent found the term "on the United States payroll of the employer" to be
"a term of art with significance within the Microsoft community." 93
In contrast to the anti-big business approach espoused by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Microsoft I and II, other circuits have taken a
softer approach. These circuits have given a much greater level of defer-
85. Id. at 1019.
86. Id.
87. See id. (citing Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1087 (Wash. 1984)).
88. ld.
89. Id. at 1020.
90. See id' The dissent found that if sufficient consideration was involved, it was in the
form of Microsoft paying higher wages to the freelancers than it did to its regular employ-
ees in exchange for the lack of benefits. See id
91. See id at 1022.
92. See id. The dissent reiterated that the court's statements in dicta do not bind the
plan administrator in any way. See id.
93. Id. at 1022. If properly construed as a term of art, such usage would go a long way




ence to employers' considerations, the individual plans at issue, and rea-
sonable interpretations of those plans.
b. Clark 94 v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours95
Earlier in the same year as the Microsoft II decision, the Fourth Circuit
separately addressed the employee benefits issue. The Fourth Circuit,
however, showed much greater deference to the employer, and the out-
come of the case was thus squarely in the employer's favor. While the
fact scenario is clearly different from that in the Microsoft cases, the two
courts faced many of the same legal issues, yet varied greatly in their
application of the law to the facts. This case is also important for its in-
depth treatment of the flexibility ERISA purports to bestow upon corpo-
rate management and plan administrators in the writing and enforcement
of their plans. 96
In both cases the courts were convinced, and rightly so, that the ulti-
mate decision to exclude members from the covered class rests with the
plan administrator. Interestingly, the Clark court decided that the plan
clearly excluded the plaintiff and thus granted a dismissal for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction.97 In Microsoft II, on the other hand, the court
was not willing to reach a similar conclusion. The Microsoft II court
properly remanded the SPP to the plan administrator for further analysis
of the plan's content. However, the Microsoft IH court was unwilling to
go even that far in the employer's favor without first opining in dicta as to
its negative feelings about Microsoft's interpretation.98
Also, though not immediately evident from the Fourth Circuit's opin-
ion, it may be surmised that DuPont's approach to the litigation did not
create many of the issues that the Microsoft courts were required to wade
through, such as the admission that waiver was no longer an issue, and
immediate compliance, such as Microsoft's compliance with the IRS. 99
94. Andrew Clark, Jr. was the original petitioner. Mr. Clark passed away after filing
the notice of appeal, and his executrix, Anne Navey Clark was substituted. Throughout
this comment reference will be made to "Clark" and "plaintiff" as if Mr. Clark was still
acting as petitioner.
95. No. 95-2845, 1997 WL 6958 (4th Cir. Jan 9, 1997), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2425
(1997).
96. At least one practitioner has relied on Clark as clear evidence that "leased em-
ployees may be excluded from participation in an employer's qualified plans by express
language to that effect." Joni L. Andrioff, Leased Employee/Independent Contractor Is-
sues, SD07 A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY 677, Jun. 29, 1998, at 685 (citing Abraham v.
Exxon Corp., 85 F.3d 1126 (5th Cir. 1996) and Bronk v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel., Inc.,
140 F.3d 1335 (10th Cir. 1998)).
97. See Clark, 1997 WL 6958 at *1, 3.
98. See Microsoft II, 120 F.2d at 1012-15.
99. From the litigants' perspective, the streamlining of the judicial process itself is a
benefit in terms of resources spent. However, the real value to subsequent litigants may be
a realization that issues such as waiver are winnable, and that administrative agencies such
as the IRS are not always correct, or for that matter, controlling in any given situation.
Where the litigant takes a potentially winnable issue out of the court's hands and fore-
closes the issue through its own actions, it may have done itself a disservice.
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In Clark, there was no dispute as to the employment status of the plain-
tiff. The plaintiff had been a full-time employee of DuPont prior to being
terminated and going to work for a succession of employment agencies
and employee leasing agencies. During his subsequent employment, he
had occasional and, during certain periods, extensive opportunity to do
contract work for DuPont while on the payroll of outside companies.
However, "[ilt is undisputed that Clark was [an employee of one of the
leasing agencies], and he understood that he was not on DuPont's
payroll."1 00
After leaving the employ of a leasing agency, Clark applied for unem-
ployment, listing the leasing agency as his former employer. Addition-
ally, Clark applied for coverage under DuPont's plans, not for the time in
which he was a full time employee, but rather for that time during which
he was an employee of the several outside agencies.' 0 ' DuPont deter-
mined that Clark had not been DuPont's employee since his termination
in 1970 and was thus ineligible for benefits under the plain language of
the plans themselves. 02 Clark did not claim that his alleged entitlement
included the period of time when he was a full time employee of DuPont.
The Fourth Circuit's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
stemmed from its finding of a lack of a colorable claim to entitlement and
thus a failure of the requisite standing to bring the action.' 03 The court's
test for determining whether a colorable claim exists includes whether
"he is, according to the language of the plan itself, eligible to receive a
benefit under the plan."' 0 4 The court determined that the plan did, in
fact, "unmistakably confer discretionary authority upon the Plan Admin-
istrator to make benefits determinations."' 0 5 Having made that determi-
nation, the court then reviewed the administrator's denial of benefits
under the plans.'0 6
The court first classified the plans into two groups. 107 The plans in the
first group limited entitlement to "any person designated by the Com-
pany as a full time employee. Any full service employee on the roll [as
100. Clark, 1997 WL 6958 at *l. Clark submitted time sheets to his new employer and
participated in the employer's health benefits plan. See id. DuPont made no contributions
to any benefit plans on Clark's behalf, and most significantly, the leasing agreement be-
tween Clark's employer and DuPont made it clear that leased workers were to be consid-
ered employees of the leasing agency and that none should be regarded as employees of
DuPont in any instance. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id. at *5.
104. Id. at *2.
105. Id. at *3. The court's review of the language of the plans was de novo. The court
also conducted a de novo review to determine whether the administrator acted within the
scope of that discretion, and found that he did. See id. at *2-*3.
106. See idt
107. See id. at *3. In the first group were a contributory group life insurance plan, a
noncontributory group life insurance plan, a career transition financial assistance plan, a
medical and dental assistance plan, and a vacation and holiday benefits policy plan. See id.




of] 12/1/85 who continues to work at least 20 hours per week on a regular
basis will be considered a Full Service Employee. ' 108 With respect to this
first group, Clark admitted that if a person is not on the DuPont roll, that
person will not receive the benefits. 10 9 Clark was not on DuPont's pay-
roll at the time the suit was commenced, thus he was not eligible to par-
ticipate in the first group of plans.
As to the second group, for the limited purpose of obtaining favorable
tax treatment under the IRC, DuPont counted all employees, payroll and
leased, as covered employees for the plan." 0 While the court did not
provide the specific tax advantages sought by DuPont, it can be deduced
from the court's reference to I.R.C. § 414 that DuPont sought to include
leased employees as a means of increasing the scope of the term "em-
ployee" for minimum participation requirements purposes."'
The plans within the second group, however, specifically exclude indi-
viduals who are treated as employees of DuPont for the limited purpose
of satisfying I.R.C. § 414(n) from the receipt of benefits. The court found
that, because Clark was a leased employee and leased employees were
excluded by the specific language of the plan, the plan administrator did
not abuse his discretion in denying benefits.1' 2
Clark argued entitlement to benefits under the plans in the second
group because DuPont could not include employees for tax purposes yet
exclude them for benefits purposes. The court disagreed, noting that
"ERISA actually mandates the opposite conclusion."'" 3 Citing a recent
Fifth Circuit case, 14 the court noted that ERISA allows an employer to
limit plan coverage to certain employees, as long as the employer's choice
to do so is not based on age or length or service." 5 "ERISA simply does
not require an employer to provide benefits to every individual in that
108. Id. (quoting J.A. 717) (alternation in original).
109. See id. (citing J.A. 447).
110. The Internal Revenue Code provides favorable tax treatment for certain "quali-
fied" employee benefits plans. Under the Code, a trust forming part of a stock bonus,
pension, or profit-sharing plan of an employer for the exclusive benefit of his employees or
their beneficiaries is a "qualified" trust if, inter alia, the plan of which the trust is a part
satisfies the minimum participation requirements of I.R.C. § 410. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(3).
Section 410 in turn requires that the plan benefit a certain percentage of employees who
are not highly compensated employees. See I.R.C. § 410(b).
111. The code provides, in pertinent part, that for the purposes of § 401(a)(3), "with
respect to any person . . . for whom a leased employee performs services ... the leased
employee shall be treated as an employee of the recipient .... " I.R.C. § 414(n)(1) -
(n)(1)(A) (1994). The code further defines a leased employee as "any person who is not an
employee of the recipient and who provides services to the recipient .. ." if such services
are provided to the recipient pursuant to an agreement between the recipient and another
person, the other person has performed such services for the recipient for at least one year,
and the recipient exerts primary direction or control over the services. I.R.C. § 414(n)(2) -
(n)(2)(A)-(C) (1994).
112. See Clark, 1997 WL 6958 at *3.
113. Id.
114. Abraham v. Exxon Corp., 85 F.3d 1126 (5th Cir. 1996).




company's employment."'1 16 The court also noted that the Internal Reve-
nue Service's definition of employee does not "add any gloss to the ER-
ISA definition of an 'employee' or a 'participant' in a benefit plan
established pursuant to ERISA." 117
Clark's claims included a refusal by DuPont to provide him with copies
of the plan documents. As the court found that Clark did not have a
colorable claim for benefits under the plans, it also denied non-disclosure
statutory damages provided for under ERISA." 8
c. Trombetta v. Cragin Federal Bank" 9
Plaintiffs worked for Cragin as loan originators. Their employment
contracts specified that "it is the parties' intention that [each plaintiff]
shall be an independent contractor and not Cragin's employee for all pur-
poses. ' 120 While Cragin allowed the plaintiffs to participate in certain
employee benefit programs at their own expense, an invitation was never
extended to participate in the employee stock purchase plan (ESOP) gov-
erned by ERISA.' 21
When Cragin Financial Corporation was purchased, the ESOP was liq-
uidated and plaintiffs filed suit to enjoin the sale until their claims for
benefits under the ESOP had been addressed. The complaint was dis-
missed without prejudice by the district court to allow the plaintiffs time
to bring their claim to the plan administrators. The administrators denied
the claim, and the plaintiffs subsequently refiled their action in the district
court.
1 2 2
The plan included language establishing that the administrator had the
"exclusive responsibility and authority to control and manage the opera-
tion and administration of the Plan, including the interpretation and ap-
plication of its provisions,"' 23 as well as the power to "determine which
Employees qualify to enter the Plan.' 24
The committee established by the plan administrator determined, using
the Darden factors, that the plaintiffs were not common law employees of
116. Id. (citing Stanton v. Gulf Oil Corp., 792 F.2d 432, 434-35 (4th Cir. 1986).
117. Id.; see also Darden, 503 U.S. at 322-24 (holding that employee status under ER-
ISA is determined not by the tax code but by the common law of agency).
118. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1024(b)(4), 1132(c)(1)(B). "The Supreme Court has interpreted
the disclosure provisions as covering, among others, all former employees with colorable
claims that they will fulfill eligibility requirements in the future." Clark, 1997 WL 6958 at
*4 (quoting Firestone, 489 U.S. at 117-18). The issue of non-disclosure is well settled, as
evidenced by the Firestone case, and is not at issue for purposes of this comment.
119. Trombetta v. Cragin Fed. Bank for Say. Employee Stock Ownership Plan, 102 F.3d
1435 (7th Cir. 1996).
120. /L at 1436 (emphasis added) (alterations in original).
121. See id.
122. See id. at 1437.
123. Id. (quoting Cragin ESOP at § 12.1).
124. Id. (quoting Cragin ESOP at § 12.9).
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the bank.125 The Seventh Circuit, applying the arbitrary and capricious
standard announced in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Burch,126 together
with the clear grant of discretionary authority in the plan's language,
found that "[a]ll of these Committee decisions were well within the
bounds of its discretion to interpret the terms of the plan....
In a statement showing much more deference to employers than the
Ninth Circuit was willing to give in the Microsoft cases, the Trombetta
court finally noted: "It is not enough to determine that they are common
law employees of Cragin because Cragin need not extend this benefits
plan to all employees."'128
d. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. v. Ratcliff' 29
In Ratcliff, plaintiffs were a group of newspaper carriers claiming enti-
tlement to welfare and qualified plan benefits subsequent to an IRS tech-
nical advice memorandum which classified the workers as common law
employees. 130 However, the plaintiffs' employment contracts contained
an agreement that they were independent contractors and were not enti-
tled to benefits. 31
As the court was unable to find language in the plans which conferred
discretionary authority upon the plan administrators to determine entitle-
ment, the court applied a de novo standard of review of the decision to
withhold benefits. 132 The court agreed with the administrators' decision
to deny benefits on two grounds. First, the carriers contractually agreed
prior to commencing employment that they would not be entitled to ben-
efits; and second, the plans, by their terms, exclude the carriers.' 33
As to the contractual agreement, the court refuted plaintiffs' argument
that Darden requires that workers who meet the Darden common law
employee test are automatically entitled to ERISA benefits.' 34 "Indeed,
it is well established that employers may exclude categories of employees
from their ERISA plans.' 35 Under existing Tenth Circuit case law, the
court found expressed contractual waivers such as that at issue to "define
the relationship of [the Carriers] and [the Star] and determine their rights
125. See id. at 1439-40; see also supra note 59 and accompanying text. It should be
noted that Cragin never conceded that status as common law employees would entitle the
plaintiffs to participation. See Trombetta, 102 F.3d at 1439.
126. 489 U.S. 101 (1989). See supra note 71.
127. Trombetta, 102 F.3d at 1439.
128. Id at 1440.
129. 141 F.3d 1405 (10th Cir. 1998).
130. See id. at 1408. For unknown reasons, this advice memorandum was later retracted
by the IRS. See id. at 1408 n.2.
131. See id. at 1408.
132. See id. at 1408-09. All parties agreed to the application of de novo review in these
circumstances and the use of this standard of review is not critical to the outcome of the
case. See id. at 1409.
133. See id. at 1409-11.
134. See id.
135. Id. (citations omitted). The court noted that the intent in Darden was simply to




As to the terms of the plans, the court analyzed each of the four appli-
cable plans and determined, based on the wording of the plans, that the
carriers were intended to be excluded.' 37 More telling than the specific
wording of each of the plans is the court's extreme level of deference to
employer intention. For example, noting that two of the plans did not
provide specific guidance as to those eligible for participation, the court
latched on to the use of the phrase "eligible employees. '138 In taking a
step that might seem a stretch by ordinary standards, the court took what
would be a gargantuan leap by Microsoft standards when it announced:
"The use of the term 'eligible' suggests that some sub-group of all em-
ployees would be participants; it therefore connotes some criteria for de-
termining eligibility."'1 39 Using that logic, the court found that the plans
could not be construed to include all employees or the use of "eligible"
would become superfluous. 140
In the final analysis, the court could not, applying common sense, "ig-
nore the fact that the Carriers had signed the Agreements, which specifi-
cally provided that they would receive no benefits."' 141
B. THE ISSUES
The cases addressed in the previous section demonstrate the diver-
gence of the circuits in applying employee benefit law to the contingent
worker scenario. On one end of the spectrum we find the Microsoft
cases, at least philosophically holding all attempts to deny workers bene-
fits in contempt. At the other extreme is Ratcliff, allowing denial of bene-
fits utilizing a "common sense" approach. Unfortunately, though
presented with several opportunities to resolve the issue, the United
States Supreme Court has refused to grant certiorari in any recent case
involving contingent workers and benefit entitlement. 142 Regardless of
the sociological or philosophical underpinnings of a Supreme Court deci-
sion, guidance must be given.
The following sections look at the larger issues presented by the case
law in this area, with the goal being to aid the reader in establishing an
appropriate, well suited package of benefits plans in consideration of a
particular company's needs, as well as those of the workers affected.
136. See id. at 1410 (quoting Boren v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 933 F.2d 891, 894
(10th Cir. 1991) (alterations in original).
137. See id. at 1411-12.




142. See Microsoft Corp. v. Vizcaino, 118 S. Ct. 899 (1998) (petition for writ of certio-
rari denied); Ratcliff v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 173 (1998) (petition for writ of
certiorari denied); Clark v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 520 U.S. 1259 (1997) (petition
for writ of certiorari denied).
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1. Required ERISA Plan Coverage
One of the first questions anyone involved with establishing or ad-
ministering an employee benefit plan ought to ask is whether particular
worker classes may be systematically excluded from a benefit plan in
which they might otherwise be eligible to participate. As seen in
Clark,143 the answer would appear to be that such exclusion may be le-
gally accomplished. In fact, the weight of the case law supports this
conclusion.
Assuming a well written plan whose intended coverage is self-evi-
dent, 144 one must first ask whether the plan's coverage terms comport
with the requirements of ERISA. As noted by the Clark court, the Fifth
Circuit has boiled the coverage requirements down to their essence. 145
Section 1052(a) does nothing more than forbid employers from deny-
ing participation in an ERISA plan to an employee on the basis of age or
length of service if he is at least twenty-one years of age and has com-
pleted at least one year of service. Section 1052(a) does not prevent em-
ployers from denying participation in an ERISA plan if the employer
does so on a basis other than age or length of service.146
As a general proposition, and disregarding the issue of worker misclas-
sification brought up in the Microsoft cases, it is well established that the
mere fact of employment does not automatically entitle employees to
participation in a plan established pursuant to ERISA.147 Rather, it is the
written terms of the plan, as determined at its inception or subsequent
amendment, which are controlling. 148 Further, it is those written terms
which control, even where the tax code seems to indicate otherwise. 149
143. 1997 WL 6958.
144. In making this assumption, it must be kept in mind that a plan's terms will be
interpreted using "common understanding as revealed in common speech." See Senkier v.
Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 948 F.2d 1050, 1052 (7th Cir. 1991).
145. See Clark, 1997 WL 6958 at *4.
146. See Abraham, 85 F.3d at 1130. "A plan shall be treated as not meeting the require-
ments [for plan coverage] unless it provides that any employee who has satisfied the mini-
mum age and service requirements ... and who is otherwise entitled to participate in the
plan, [is given the opportunity to, and] commences participation in the plan .... " 29
U.S.C. § 1052(a)(4) (emphasis added).
147. See, e.g., Stanton v. Gulf Oil Corp., 792 F.2d 432,434-35 (4th Cir. 1986); Jackson v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 648 F.2d 225, 227 (5th Cir. 1981); Nugent v. Jesuit High Sch., 625
F.2d 1285, 1286 (5th Cir. 1980). "[T]he definition of the term participant does not include,
according to the United States Supreme Court ... a person who claims to be, but who is
not entitled to receive plan benefits." 1 RONALD J. COOKE, ERISA PRACtiCE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 2:8, at 2-40 to 2-41 (1996) (quoting Firestone, 489 U.S. at 103).
148. See Coleman v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 969 F.2d 54, 56 (4th Cir. 1992). "[lIt is
particularly inappropriate [to deviate from the written terms of a contract] in a case involv-
ing ERISA, which places great emphasis upon adherence to the written provisions in an
employee benefit plan." Id.
149. See West v. Clarke Murphy, Jr. Self Employed Pension Plan, 99 F.3d 166, 169 (4th
Cir. 1996) (finding that Internal Revenue Code sections 401, 410, 411, 414, 761, and 7701
"deal with minimum participation, vesting, and funding standards that must be satisfied in
order for an employee pension benefit plan to receive favorable tax treatment.... These
provisions of the Tax Code, however, do not vary ERISA's definition of participant .... ");
see also Reklau v. Merchants Nat'l Corp., 808 F.2d 628,630-31 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding that
there is no basis anywhere in ERISA to find that the provisions of the tax code that relate
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a. Arguing Breach of Fiduciary Duty
One argument that has been proffered by disgruntled employees in an
effort to overcome the rather easily satisfied requirements of section
1052(a) is that it is a breach of the employer's fiduciary duty to draft a
plan with the intention of excluding workers who would otherwise be eli-
gible.150 This argument prompts debate on two levels. First, there has
been disagreement about the term "participants." Second, there is de-
bate as to whether the argument itself, without regard to the meaning of
participants, is valid.
As to the term participant, the ERISA definition, 51 as interpreted by
the United States Supreme Court, 52 has received varying treatment from
the circuit courts. One camp has "adopted a 'zone of interests' analytical
framework for the determination of participant status, which analysis has
the apparent effect of conferring participant status on persons who do not
meet the requirements articulated in Firestone .... -153 "The decisions
adopting the 'zone of interests' theory have adopted a 'but for' analysis,
i.e., but for the employer misrepresentations or other misconduct, the
employee would still be a participant.' 54 Others have discounted this
position on the basis of its contradiction with the clear language of
ERISA.' 55
b. And Why the Argument Fails
Without regard to where one comes out on the issue of defining partici-
pant, the argument that it is a breach of the employer's fiduciary duty to
to the criteria for tax qualification under the IRS are imposed on pension plans by the
substantive terms of ERISA).
150. "[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest
of the participants ... " 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1). A fiduciary, with respect to a plan, is one
who "exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management
of such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of
its assets ... [or] has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the ad-
ministration of such plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).
151. See supra note 44.
152. See id.; supra note 147.
153. COOKE, supra note 147, at 2-42. See, e.g., Mullins v. Pfizer, Inc., 23 F.3d 663 (2d
Cir. 1994) (finding that a worker who had accepted an early retirement plan had standing
to sue under ERISA because he claimed that the employer had misled him concerning the
availability of a more substantial retirement benefits package).
154. Id. at 2-43. See also Swinney v. Gen. Motors Corp., 46 F.3d 512,519 (6th Cir. 1995)
(holding that so long as a former employee would have been in a class eligible for member-
ship in the plan but for the fiduciary's alleged breach of duty, he "may become eligible" for
benefits under that plan as that term is used in the ERISA definition of participant).
155. See, ag., Stanton, 792 F.2d at 435 (finding that the plaintiff's broad interpretation
of participation was inconsistent with ERISA); Raymond v. Mobil Oil Corp., 983 F.2d
1528, 1536 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding "that a 'participant' is any person who claims to be one
begs the question of who is a 'participant' and renders the definition set forth in § 1002(7)
superfluous.") (quoting Firestone, 489 U.S. at 117). Additionally, ERISA sets minimum
standards for participation and provides that a plan may require one year of service and
the attaining of age twenty-one before an employee is qualified as a participant. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1052(a)(1)(A)-(B). "A new employee does not automatically become a participant by
remaining on his job while waiting to become a vested employee in the future." Stanton,
792 F.2d at 435.
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draft a plan with the intention of excluding workers who would otherwise
be eligible fails on other grounds. It is possible, and quite probable, that
an employer, in designing his plan, does so with valid and legal business
motivations at heart.156 It is well accepted that an employer does not act
as a fiduciary when designing an ERISA plan.157 It was not Congressss'
intent "that ERISA circumscribe employers' control over the content of
benefits plans they offered to their employees."' 58 Additionally, it clearly
was Congress's intent in enacting ERISA that any amount of costs to the
employer in providing employee benefits would not exceed the foresee-
able amount of benefit to the employee.159 It is not the job of the courts
to usurp the business manager's authority, expertise, or judgment in this
regard. 160
2. Waiver of Benefits
a. As a General Proposition
On its face, the Microsoft H case might appear to stand for the notion
that ERISA benefits may not be waived. As a general proposition, how-
ever, this would be a misinterpretation.' 6 ' Where an employee, other-
156. "An employer can wear two hats: one as a fiduciary administering a pension plan
and the other as the drafter of a plan's terms." McGath v. Auto-Body N. Shore, Inc., 7
F.3d 665, 670 (7th Cir. 1993).
157. See Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 890 (1996); McGath, 7 F.3d at 670-71;
Abraham, 85 F.3d at 1130; see also Izzarelli v. Rexene Prod. Co., 24 F.3d 1506, 1524 (5th
Cir. 1994) (finding that as part of the balance between an employer's need to manage its
business and Congress's desire for the regulation of ERISA plans, an employer is given
greater discretion to act with regard to a plan when his actions are as an employer, instead
of as a fiduciary); Haberern v. Kaupp Vascular Surgeons Ltd. Defined Benefit Pension
Plan, 24 F.3d 1491, 1498 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that "an employer is free to develop an
employee benefit plan as it wishes because when it does so it makes a corporate manage-
ment decision, unrestricted by ERISA's fiduciary duties"). Other examples of business
practices that have been held not to be regulated by ERISA include decisions to amend or
even terminate plans. See Izzarelli 24 F.3d at 1524; McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d
401 (5th Cir. 1991); Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Milwaukee Brewery Workers' Pension Plan,
3 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 1993).
158. McGann, 946 F.2d at 407.
159. "ERISA does not mandate that employers provide any particular benefits, and
does not itself proscribe discrimination in the provision of employee benefits." Shaw v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 91 (1983). See generally Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners,
Inc., 908 F.2d 1155, 1159 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that an interpretation that plans, once
created, cannot be narrowed or eliminated by later amendment is inconsistent with ER-
ISA's language, structure, and legislative history). For a thorough yet straightforward
analysis of the policy reasons behind separating the roles of fiduciary and business man-
ager, see id. at 1159-60.
160. Neither Congress nor the courts are involved in either the decision to estab-
lish a plan or in the decision concerning which benefits a plan should provide.
In particular, courts have no authority to decide which benefits employers
must confer upon their employees; these are decisions which are more appro-
priately influenced by forces in the marketplace and, when appropriate, by
federal legislation.
Moore v. Reynolds Metals Co. Retirement Program for Salaried Employees, 740 F.2d 454,
456 (6th Cir. 1984).
161. An argument has been made that this is a proper effect in the case of misclassified
workers such as in Microsoft, and a proposal for this anomalous situation is considered
infra Part III-B-2-b.
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wise qualified for participation in an ERISA plan, signs a waiver of his
rights of participation, such waiver may in fact be valid and legally bind-
ing. "ERISA contains no specific statutory prohibition against ... waiv-
ers of rights to benefits under ERISA, and case authority has confirmed
that neither public policy nor the specific provisions of ERISA preclude
a ... waiver of pension participation and pension rights." 162 In fact, as
noted by the Second Circuit, a finding that waiver of ERISA benefits is
impermissible would be surprising, "since ERISA does not require all eli-
gible individuals to participate in a plan, explicitly recognizing, for exam-
ple, that an employee may decline to contribute to a plan that requires
employee contributions for participation."' 163
The legislative history behind ERISA confirms that public policy con-
cerns would dictate that waiver should be allowed. "A fundamental as-
pect of present law, which the committee bill continues, is reliance on
voluntary action by employers (and employees under contributory
plans)...."164 "The primary purpose of the bill is the protection of indi-
vidual pension rights, but the committee has been constrained to recog-
nize the voluntary nature of private retirement plans."' 6 5
For such a waiver to be effective, however, it must comport with the
traditional standards for waivers. That is, the waiver must be knowingly
and voluntarily made.' 66 The Laniok court listed the following six factors
for determining through the "totality of the circumstances" that the re-
lease of benefits was knowing and voluntary:
1) the plaintiff's education and business experience, 2) the amount of
time the plaintiff had possession of or access to the agreement before
signing it, 3) the role of the plaintiff in deciding the terms of the
agreement, 4) the clarity of the agreement, 5) whether the plaintiff
was represented by or consulted with an attorney, ... and 6) whether
the consideration given in exchange for the waiver exceeds employee
benefits to which the employee was already entitled by contract or
162. 2 RONALD J. COOKE, ERISA PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE § 8:11, at 8-53 (1996).
See Laniok v. Advisory Comm., 935 F.2d 1360, 1366 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that "an indi-
vidual waiver of the right to participate [does not] var[y] the terms of the plan itself ....
Moreover, it is precisely because we find no ERISA provision .. . mandating participation
for all who are eligible that we hold permissible an individual waiver of participation.").
See also Rodriguez-Abreu v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 986 F.2d 580, 588 (1st Cir.
1993) (finding employee not entitled to benefits from a long term disability plan where he
signed a release and waiver in accepting benefits from another plan); Astor v. Int'l Bus.
Mach. Corp., 7 F.3d 533 (6th Cir. 1993) (rejecting claim of fraudulent inducement on the
grounds that the employees accepted an incentive retirement package in exchange for a
complete release of their right to sue); Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas
Health & Welfare Fund v. Boyd, 762 F. Supp. 1263, 1265 (S.D. Miss. 1991) (holding that
ERISA does not prevent a waiver of welfare plan rights).
163. Laniok, 935 F.2d at 1365 (referring to 29 U.S.C. § 1053(b)(1)(B)).
164. H.R. REP. No. 93-807, at 18 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670, 4676
(emphasis added).
165. H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 1 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639 (emphasis
added).




b. Waiver as Applied to Misclassified Workers
The Microsoft court was able to sidestep the issue of waiver of ERISA
benefits thanks, in part, to Microsoft's concession that waiver was not at
issue. 168 It has been argued that while the Microsoft court "correctly
found that the workers were eligible for benefits, its emphasis on the
character of the agreements failed to confront the real issue facing courts:
the validity of waivers of federally regulated benefits."'1 69 The propo-
nents of that argument call for an announcement of a rule of interpreta-
tion that would invalidate any disclaimer of benefits by misclassified
employees on a per se basis, finding that such a rule would allow courts to
better confront future attempts to contract around benefit provisions.170
The crux of the argument is that misclassified workers do not and cannot
realize that they are entitled to the benefits they are waiving, and thus
any waiver of those benefits will not comport with the knowingly and
voluntarily requirements of traditional waiver doctrine. 71
However, such a rule would be overly restrictive. The person who
chooses to work as an independent contractor or the like understands,
and knowingly and voluntarily accepts, that he will not receive benefits.
To allow the worker benefits as a result of a reclassification could quite
possibly result in a windfall to the worker.172 Considering the number of
workers who choose to enter into a contingent work arrangement for its
flexibility and potentially higher wages, such a rule would have poten-
tially catastrophic consequences for businesses that rely on the contingent
workforce.173
The argument of the proponents of the per se waiver rule that
"[m]isclassified employees cannot know that they qualify for benefits
conditioned on employee status [and therefore] cannot make a knowing
waiver"174 is inconsequential. What is of consequence is that the employ-
ees waive their rights to benefits and are willing to accept the working
arrangement on that condition, often at the reward of a higher salary.
Whether the right to benefits arises out of a subsequent reclassification or
167. Id. (cautioning that any attempt to establish a checklist of all applicable factors or
insisting on adherence to such a list is futile).
168. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
169. Contracts-Independent Contractor Agreements-Ninth Circuit Finds That Mis-
classified Employees are Eligible for Federally Regulated Employee Benefits.-Vizcaino v.
Microsoft Corp., 120 E3d 1006 (9th Cir. 1997) (En Banc), 111 HARv. L. REv. 609, 612
(1997) [hereinafter Contracts].
170. See id.
171. See id. at 612-13.
172. Consider for example the Microsoft workers. Microsoft paid these workers at a
higher hourly rate than its regular employees as consideration for their giving up entitle-
ment to benefits. See Microsoft II, 120 F.3d at 1018 (O'Scannlain, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
173. See supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
174. Contracts, supra note 169, at 612.
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any other number of reasons should not be determinative of the validity
of the waiver at issue.
If the per se waiver proponents' argument is sound, and an individual
cannot waive that to which he does not know he is entitled, the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp.175 is incorrect. The Gilmer Court upheld an arbitration agreement
in the face of Gilmer's claim that he had the right to a judicial remedy
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.176 Gilmer
had no knowledge that he would one day seek redress for perceived age
discrimination, yet the Court found that his signing of a contract includ-
ing an arbitration agreement was effective in waiving his right to judicial
resolution. 177
IV. LESSONS TO BE LEARNED
With their obvious ramifications for corporate America, the Microsoft
cases have received a great deal of attention. 178 The resultant widespread
paranoia that has hit corporate America and her legal counsel in the
wake of Microsoft II may have given those decisions more credence than
they are worth,179 yet they do have some practical significance for corpo-
rations and individuals who utilize or extend their services as members of
the contingent workforce. 180 At the very least, the differing treatment
afforded by the various circuits should put corporate and employment
attorneys on notice that some circuits may be critical of the use of the
contingent workforce and should prompt those attorneys to encourage
their clients to conduct a thorough review of current employment prac-
tices and benefit plans.' 8 '
First and foremost, employers should take an honest, objective look at
the need for using members of the contingent workforce, particularly in-
dependent contractors, temporary and leased employees, and the current
policies and practices in place relating to their use.182 Corporate heads
must also ensure that managers are educated regarding worker classifica-
tion issues, encouraging managers to think about the issues and to con-
sider the consequences before entering into employment contracts. 183 If
the use of the contingent workforce remains the best option, there are
several things which must be done to protect the employer's interests.
175. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
176. See id. at 23.
177. See id. at 35.
178. See En Banc Ninth Circuit Rehears Oral Argument in Vizcaino, ANDREW'S PEN-
SION FUND LIrNG. REP., May 2, 1997, at 7670.
179. "In view of the fact-specific nature of the decision[s], [they are] unlikely to be of
great precedential or persuasive value to other courts in the future." Garofalo, supra note
38 at *11.
180. See id.
181. See Perkins, supra note 64, at 209.
182. See Garofalo, supra note 38, at *11.
183. See Andrioff, supra note 96, at 705.
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The employer would be well-served to evaluate his utilization of those
workers to determine if his use might be questionable should an audit or
claim for benefits arise, perhaps using the IRS guidelines as a starting
point.184 Also, rather than directly hiring contingent workers, employers
may do better to utilize the services of temporary employment agencies
and employee leasing agencies, in particular, those that extend their own
benefits. 185
It goes without saying that employers must enter into written agree-
ments with their employees. However, this critical step in shielding the
employer from surprises, should legal action arise, is often overlooked
when it comes to certain members of the contingent workforce. 186 When
these agreements include benefit plans, the employer can take numerous
precautions in the drafting of such plans to ensure that his intentions are
understood by the workers while increasing the odds that the courts will
follow that intent.
The following suggestions assume the existence of a current plan but
are equally useful in the development of a new plan. It should be
remembered that an employer may amend existing plans, and, if he does
so, he acts in the capacity of businessman rather than fiduciary.' 8 7 If
amendments are made, however, the amendments must be furnished to
the plan participants and beneficiaries receiving benefits under the plan
not later than 210 days after the end of the plan year in which the change
is adopted.' 8
As evidenced by Microsoft II, Clark, Trombetta, and Radcliff, precise
wording is absolutely critical to the success of any plan in achieving its
originator's intentions.' 89 Employers and plan administrators must con-
duct a thorough analysis of their plans' definitions of eligible employ-
ees. 9° Having conducted a review, there are several possibilities for
handling reclassification by the IRS. First, the plan might simply state
that workers who are initially classified as independent contractors on the
employer's books and records are excluded from coverage.'91 An even
clearer plan might include language declaring that even if a worker is
184. See id.; see also supra notes 54-58.
185. See Garofalo, supra note 38, at *11.
186. See Brent Giddens, Terminating the Temporary Employee: A Trap for the Unwary
Employer, ANDREWS EMPLOYMENT LrrlG. REP., Feb. 11, 1997, at *1. "While most compa-
nies have written agreements with their customers or suppliers, few which use temporary
agency employees have an agreement that specifically addresses the consequences of legal
action by a temporary employee." Id.
187. See supra notes 157-58.
188. See I.R.C. § 1024 (b)(3) (West Supp. 1997).
189. It should be noted that even the Microsoft II opinion indicated that a more care-
fully worded plan may have saved the day for Microsoft. See supra note 78 and accompa-
nying text.
190. See Arthur D. Rutkowski & Barbara Lang Rutkowski, Independent Contractors or
Employees as it Pertains to Employee Benefit Plans-Microsoft Update, EMPLOYMENT L.
UPDATE, Sept. 1997, at *3.
191. See Alson R. Martin, Current Tax and Planning Developments Concerning Retire-
ment Plans, Welfare Plans, Professional Corporations and LLCs, Estate Planning, and
Health Care, SB51 A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY, Feb. 13, 1997, at *47.
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subsequently determined to be an employee by the IRS, such reclassifica-
tion does not automatically entitle the worker to benefits. 192 Along the
lines of this consideration, it has been suggested that the plan include a
directive that the employer must take some affirmative action upon
change of status in order for the workers to become entitled to bene-
fits. 193 Finally, an alternate method, if appropriate in the particular cir-
cumstance, might include language to the effect that cash payment is the
sole compensation for a particular class of workers even if they are even-
tually reclassified as employees, and if the employer is forced to include
them in employee benefit plans, they may be liable to repay their cash
compensation.' 9 4
It is vital that the plan clearly and conclusively confer discretion upon
the plan administrator to interpret the plan and to decide any questions
arising under the plan. The United States Supreme Court's holding in
Firestone v. Bruch'95 made it clear that the appropriate standard for re-
viewing a plan administrator's determination of benefit eligibility is de
novo, unless the plan gives the administrator discretionary authority, in
which case the courts must apply an arbitrary and capricious standard.1 96
"Although no specific language need appear in a plan for a court to apply
deferential review, the broader the language conferring discretion, the
more likely a court is to apply deferential review."'197
Assuming that the plan grants full discretion to the administrator, it is
important that certain procedures be followed by the administrator in
making determinations. If a worker disputes the plan administrator's rul-
ing, it is critical that the administrative record reflect not just conclusions,
but the analysis applied in reaching those conclusions. 198
Finally, employers should think twice before leaping into settlement
agreements with the IRS and should consider all of the potential ramifi-
cations to their employee benefit plans. On the one hand, such agree-
ments may invite suits for retroactive benefits. 199 On the other, an
employer who hastily concedes to the IRS's decision may overlook the
availability of the safe harbor provisions of section 530 of the Tax Reform
192. See Rutkowski, supra note 190.
193. See Andrioff, supra note 96, at 705.
194. See Microsoft Employees, supra note 53, at 15.
195. 489 U.S. 101, 103 (1989).
196. See supra note 71. For an in-depth look at the various circuits' interpretations of
the arbitrary and capricious standard announced in Firestone, see Roger C. Siske et al.,
What's New In Employee Benefits, SB17 A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY, Oct. 3, 1996, at
246-52.
197. Id. at 247.
198. See Catherine L. Creech, Worker Classification Issues: Consequences for Employee
Benefit Plans, SB66 A.L.I.-A.B.A COURSE OF STUDY, Mar. 19, 1997, at 336.
199. Such a settlement may be much more expensive than anticipated if it leads
to lawsuits from the workers for retroactive benefits and salary. For this rea-
son, companies faced with an IRS payroll tax dispute over the status of con-
tract workers may decide it is more in their long-term interest to mount a






As corporate America becomes increasingly centered on technology,
its need for efficient, short-term labor will continue to grow. With this
growth, corporations will be forced to step up the vigilance in their rela-
tions with the workforce. The courts and the legislature will struggle right
along-side corporate America as all involved search for the most efficient
and just method of dealing with contingent workers.
For now, there is no correct answer. Several circuits have taken a first
stab at the issue, but there is no consensus on many of the relevant issues.
In time, the United States Supreme Court will likely address the issues
and put to rest much of the debate. Until that happens, corporate
America and her attorneys must step up to the plate and take control.
This comment has pointed out several avenues which have worked in the
past and passed judicial scrutiny. Based on their sound reasoning, these
approaches will likely continue to work in the future.
When future decisions with the tone of Microsoft I and 11 come down,
as they surely will, the informed attorney and businessman will not see
them as a harbinger for the death of the contingent workforce, but as a
reminder to reanalyze their own practices. By looking at these decisions
under a microscope and carefully reviewing current practices, a large step
will have been taken towards ensuring compliance.
Remember, odd facts make odd law, 201 and it never hurts to under-
stand the political climate of the court before which you are arguing.
202
200. See supra note 60.
201. See supra text accompanying note 1.
202. As humorously put in one commentary, "Readers are, no doubt, familiar with the
curse-'may you live in interesting times.' If the speaker had said 'may you live in an
interesting circuit,' it would have meant the 9th." Robert N. Eccles & David E. Gordon,
The 9th Circuit-Threat or Menace?, ERISA LrNG. REP., Feb. 1997, at *2.
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